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Rising healthcare costs have resulted in a wide-spread debate about whether we, as a society,
are getting value for our healthcare dollars. Debate
over this important question has recently deterio-
rated into managed care bashing for apparently
emphasizing cost containment at the expense of
providing quality healthcare. This view ignores the
truism that "you get what you pay for," and refuses
to acknowledge that, in a free market, service pro-
viders reflect the values of their customers. Mean-
while, academicians and policy-makers speak about
the provision of "cost-effective, high-quality health-
care ... at an affordable price." A cynical observer
may wonder whether the latter phrase is an oxymo-
ron. The answer is completely dependent upon the
definitions of quality and affordable. In economic
terms, quality and affordability are linked by soci-
ety's willingness to pay.
A rational approach society could employ to
make cost-quality trade-offs is to consistently em-
ploy cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) as a decision
analytic tool for healthcare decision-making. While
CEA has been widely advocated by academic re-
searchers, private industry, and public health offi-
cials, it has not really been applied in decision-
making to rationalize healthcare expenditure or to
restrict access to expensive new healthcare technol-
ogies. Many consider CEA methodology (as de-
scribed in the Gold et al. Reference Case) to be the
appropriate or preferred method for economic eval-
uation because it takes the societal point of view
[1]. But unlike cost-benefit analysis (CBA), there is
no social welfare theory that suggests that consis-
tent use of CEA for resource allocation will opti-
mize consumer utility.
Nevertheless, as Garber and Phelps argue, under
reasonable theoretical assumptions, CEA may ap-
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proximate CBA [2,3]. Whether these theoretical
conditions are empirically met closely enough for
valid approximation is still an open question; but if
they are not, CEA becomes an inadequate tool for
social policy that aims to maximize social welfare.
Underlying this CENCBA approach are the pre-
sumptions that any winners in the distribution of
new program benefits can compensate the losers (a
necessary condition for welfare economics), and that
the distributional equity impacts of program costs
and benefits are politically and socially feasible.
Many arguments can be made that the real
world does not operate this way. Nevertheless, as a
tool to assist decision-makers, CEA makes transpar-
ent the assumptions that drive conclusions about
trade-offs between costs and health outcomes, which
is always useful. One could cite many reasons as to
why the utility of CEA as a decision aid has not been
realized; however, a central factor is that purchasers
of healthcare do not try to optimize social welfare.
They do not worry about society's willingness to
pay for different services and benefits; rather they
consider its willingness to buy. The largest purchas-
ers of healthcare, employers and governments, are
currently emphasizing cost containment. Their will-
ingness to buy reflects a financial analysis based on
perceived limitation of resources, rather than an in-
tent to maximize social welfare by using resources
(either more or less than used currently) in the most
efficient manner.
While there is a general relationship between
the distribution of healthcare services and health
outcomes, in a sense this relationship is incidental
to the primary financial driver of healthcare deci-
sions. The discordance between the existing lim-
ited-resource financial analytic model and the de-
sired health-outcomes optimization model is often
substantial. Whether one looks at market-based
healthcare systems as in the United States, or gov-
ernment-based systems as in Canada and Europe,
population health benefits are frequently realized
in the long term, while financial considerations are
usually managed on a yearly budgetary cycle. For
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managed care organizations and government health-
care programs to remain financially viable, they
must be able to generate revenues through premi-
ums or taxes that cover the costs of services ren-
dered. Clearly they have been struggling recently;
many managed care organizations in the United
States are losing money, and government health-
care programs around the world are struggling with
deficits [4].
Theoretically, in a market-oriented system, if
there is demand for increased services, plans should
be able to either charge higher premiums or attract
sufficient new enrollees in order to realize the econo-
mies of scale that foster fiscal solvency. This has not
happened in the United States because employers
have benefited from free-market competition among
providers, which has afforded them the opportunity
to purchase care at close to the marginal cost of pro-
viding it-which is less than the average cost of care.
This has kept premium increases relatively small; in-
dividuals change plans mostly when they switch em-
ployers, or to decrease their healthcare premiums.
Thus, individuals and employers display a very low
willingness to buy coverage for additional services
including new, expensive pharmaceuticals. In eco-
nomic terms, this is a "market failure." With perfect
knowledge and better healthcare financing arrange-
ments, consumers would almost certainly purchase
different bundles of healthcare than they are cur-
rently offered in the marketplace.
This analysis also applies to our willingness to
buy greater healthcare quality. Increases in quality
frequently translate into the provision of additional
services. If governments, employers, or individuals
really were willing to buy higher quality healthcare
services, they should be willing to pay more, right?
This does not generally appear to be the case, and we
have not seen a market for higher-quality/higher-cost
healthcare emerge. In such circumstances, should the
public blame governments or managed care for em-
phasizing cost containment? Or should we look to
ourselves and begin a public dialogue regarding
how we value health and healthcare?
Such a dialogue would reveal the arbitrary basis
upon which experts declare certain healthcare man-
agement strategies as "cost-effective" or "not." Such
assertions have been used to justify formulary and
healthcare benefit decisions that have really been
based on fiscal concerns. Although the term "cost-
effective" is often confused with "cost-saving,"
few interventions truly save money. In the United
States, interventions that cost up to $40,000 per
quality-adjusted life-year are often considered "cost-
effective," whereas those that cost above $100,000
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per quality-adjusted life-year are not; and those be-
tween $40,000 and $100,000 are considered in a
"gray zone" [5]. The source of this "standard" is
unclear, but it represents a judgment based upon a
retrospective look as to what had been adopted
within a fee-for-service system. It is not clear that
this standard accurately reflects US societal behav-
ior in the current managed care environment. Thus,
it would be reasonable to revisit these "standards"
in light of changing societal values.
The valuation of health outcomes presents a dif-
ficult methodological problem because there are no
direct mechanisms for establishing market prices
for these outcomes. Various techniques have been
employed, including expert opinion, examination of
past policy decisions (such as legislative decisions),
review of court awards (for pain, suffering, and loss
of life), cost-of-illness analysis (including all of the
medical and nonmedical costs as well as produc-
tivity losses associated with morbidity and mortal-
ity), and willingness-to-pay analysis. The latter is
considered the preferred approach by many econo-
mists because it attempts most directly to measure
the marketplace valuation of particular health out-
comes [6].
Willingness to pay (WTP) may be measured by
examining differences in compensation for occu-
pations associated with higher risks, or, more com-
monly, by contingent-valuation studies. The hitter
involves surveying individual preferences when
hypothetical situations are posed (although it is
widely acknowledged that there may be large dif-
ferences between preferences that people express
and what they actually do); moreover, how ques-
tions are posed can have a significant impact on
the preferences elicited. Additionally, individual
preferences are not fixed; they change over time
and are dependent upon circumstance. Individuals
who have experienced adverse health outcomes
are willing to pay more than healthy people. Simi-
larly, individuals who suspect they may be at risk
for a disease (for instance, because of a positive
family history) are willing to pay more compared
with those who don't have such a history. Thus,
the results of a WTP survey are influenced by the
composition of the group and may not mirror that
of society. Finally, the results of WTP studies will
generally reflect the fact that wealthy individuals
are usually willing to pay more than economically
disadvantaged individuals, a fundamental issue as-
sociated with income/wealth distribution.
Even without these limitations, the relevance of
the results of WTP studies to current marketplace
behavior may be questioned. In the current US em-
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ployer-based health insurance system, the prefer-
ences of individuals may be secondary to those of
the corporate entities who supply healthcare as a
benefit. Employers see medical care as an expendi-
ture that must be managed as one of the many costs
of doing business. Since few individuals change em-
ployment based upon health benefits, the employer-
driven movement to demand quality healthcare from
providers may correlate poorly with the actual pref-
erences of their employees. Additionally, since em-
ployees often do not directly pay for the full cost of
their health benefits, they view them as "free goods"
and do not value them appropriately. Even when
individuals buy their health insurance directly, they
have difficulty placing an accurate value on the
benefits. We usually buy specific products sepa-
rately when needed (e.g., apples, oranges, cars), not
in aggregate and not in advance (e.g., gardening
supplies for a year). Thus, the willingness to buy for
healthcare in the marketplace is not tightly linked
to the theoretical societal willingness to pay for par-
ticular health interventions demonstrated by aca-
demic researchers.
Ultimately, this disjunction must be resolved be-
fore we can have any assurance that identifying a
health intervention as "cost-effective" is meaning-
ful. Healthcare has come to be viewed as a "right"
in most developed countries. As yet, around the
world there is little consensus that. there need to be
limitations on the availability of healthcare resources
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(i.e., rationing)-with a core of effective services
available to all, and with other healthcare services
provided on patients ability to pay. How we define
value in healthcare may change in the coming years,
but it will likely fall somewhere in between the theo-
retical societal willingness to pay and the willingness
to buy currently observed in the marketplace and in
government programs.
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